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 Several scholars have pointed out a peculiar feature of the classical Såµkhya 
system. Eli Franco (1991: 123 f.) describes it as follows: "One of the reasons why many 
of us feel uneasy with the Såµkhya philosophy is that we are never quite sure where we 
stand and whether the ancient teachers were talking psychology or cosmology. Typical 
psychological and individual terms like cognition, ego, mind, sense organs, and even 
hands, feet, tongue, anus and penis, become trans-individual and obtain cosmological 
dimensions."1  
 At another occasion I have presented some reflections on the origin of this 
peculiar state of affairs.2 This time I wish to address the question to what extent the 
classical philosophers of Såµkhya themselves knew whether they were talking 
psychology or cosmology. It should not be forgotten that Såµkhya is more than 
unreflected expression of religious sentiment. Såµkhya was, or became, a school that 
was in constant interaction with others school of thought in classical India. This 
interaction took the form of oral or written debates, in which philosophers criticised 
each other's thoughts, and would not hesitate to attack their weakest sides. The 
development of Indian philosophy is, at least to some extent, the story of the attempts 
made to defend one's views against the attacks of others. We know from various sources 
— e.g., the accounts given by visiting Chinese [680] Buddhist pilgrims — that 
proponents of Såµkhya participated actively in these encounters. The question is 
therefore inescapable to know whether these thinkers really defended a point of view in 
which psychology and cosmology where somehow confused. Indeed, a priori it is hard 
to believe that this was the case. Wouldn't the classical thinkers have noticed such an 
ambiguity? And what is more, wouldn't other thinkers have jumped on this feature of 
the Såµkhya philosophy and shown its weakness? 
                                                
1 Hulin (1978: 73) speaks of "le paradoxe d'un Ego «cosmique», producteur des sens et des éléments 
matériels subtils, et non plus, semble-t-il, forme de la conscience de soi chez un individu concret". He 
then continues: "Cependant, aussi objectivé et dépersonnalisé soit-il, l'ahaµkåra n'en conserve pas moins, 
à l'intérieur du système Såµkhya, une face individuelle, subjective, puisqu'on lui associe constamment 
l'abhimåna, cette fonction de sur-estimation (de soi) qui lui sera désormais automatiquement attribuée. 
Comme on ne saurait évidemment pas se contenter de juxtaposer les deux aspects, cosmique et indi-
viduel, le problème se pose immédiatement de concevoir leur mode d'articulation." Parrott (1986) makes 
a brave, but unconvincing, attempt to solve the difficulty. 
2 Bronkhorst, 2001. 
THE CONTRADICTION OF SÓ»KHYA  2 
 
 
 What reasons are there to think that such confusion actually existed? Most 
important in this regard is no doubt the Såµkhya scheme of evolution. It is presented in 
the following form in the Såµkhya Kårikå, one of our most important sources for 
classical Såµkhya: From prak®ti (or pradhåna) arises mahat (nom. mahån) or buddhi, 
from mahat/buddhi: ahaµkåra, from ahaµkåra: the five organs of knowledge 
(buddh¥ndriya), the five organs of action (karmendriya), the mind (manas) and the five 
tanmåtras. From the five tanmåtras, finally, arise the five elements ((mahå-)bhËta).3 The 
organs of knowledge and action, as well as the mind, clearly belong to an individual. 
Yet this evolutionary scheme claims to be more that the coming into being of an 
individual; it describes the coming into being of the universe at creation. This would 
imply that it describes the coming into being of numerous organs etc., one set for each 
individual. Their source (mËlaprak®ti / pradhåna) is nonetheless presented as single. 
 A similar contradiction seems to find expression in Såµkhya Kårikå 59:4 "Just 
as a dancer withdraws from her dance having shown [herself] to the audience, so prak®ti 
withdraws, having revealed herself to the puru∑a." Since there is only one prak®ti, but 
numerous puru∑as, one wonders which puru∑a is here being talked about. The verse 
clearly deals with liberation, but it  should not be concluded that, with the liberation of 
one puru∑a, the whole material world comes to an end. Yet this is what the verse 
suggests. We also know that one thinker of the Såµkhya school, Paurika, postulated the 
existence of as many pradhånas as there are puru∑as,5 and this would obviously solve 
the problem we are dealing with. 
[681] 
 I have no doubt that these ideas date from a time when Såµkhya, or a precursor, 
did indeed concern psychology and cosmology at the same time. I find it harder to 
believe that the classical thinkers of the school still held on to this position in 
unmodified form. True, they belonged to a tradition and could not reject its traditional 
positions. But they could interpret, or reinterpret, these positions so as to avoid 
becoming objects of ridicule at debating encounters. I believe that the commentaries on 
the Såµkhya Kårikå contain some indications — unfortunately far too few — that this 
is what they did. 
                                                
3 Cp. SK 22: prak®ter mahåµs tato 'haµkåras tasmåd gaˆaß ca ∑o∂aßaka˙/ tasmåd api ∑o∂aßakåt 
pañcabhya˙ pañca bhËtåni//. 
4 SK 59: ra∫gasya darßayitvå nivartate nartak¥ yathå n®tyåt/ puru∑asya tathåtmånaµ prakåßya vinivartate 
prak®ti˙//. 
5 Cp. YD p. 141 l. 4-5 (Pandeya) / p. 262 l. 11-14 (Wezler/Motegi): pratipuru∑am anyat pradhånaµ 
ßar¥rådyarthaµ karoti/ te∑åµ ca måhåtmyaßar¥rapradhånaµ yadå pravartate tadetaråˆy api/ tanniv®ttau ca 
te∑åm api niv®ttir iti paurika˙ såµkhyåcåryo manyate/. 
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 We have considered verse 59 above, which compares prak®ti to a dancer: both 
withdraw after having shown themselves. The Yuktid¥pikå comments in the following 
manner:6 
 
In this [verse] the collection of men whose castes, natures and knowledge are 
different, [but] who do wish to see [the dance performance], is called ‘audience’. 
The dance performance by the dancer pleases the [audience], and aims at many 
men. If someone were to say "why doesn't she withdraw having [merely] been 
seen by the dance master or by the singers?" [the answer is:] that in that 
situation she does not withdraw because the desire of the whole audience has not 
been suppressed. Why? Because the aim has not been obtained. Prak®ti has 
come into action in order to fulfil the purposes of all  the puru∑as, which are 
uneasy because of their connection with the instruments that bring about effects 
[in the material world]. How could prak®ti have obtained its/her aim when one 
single puru∑a is freed from its unease? It follows that it is not correct [to think] 
that prak®ti withdraws having revealed itself/herself to one single puru∑a. (my 
emphasis, JB) 
 
It is clear that the author of this commentary did not interpret the verse in the way we 
were initially tempted to do so. The world does not come to an end with the liberation 
of one person. 
 In a way this is already clear from Såµkhya Kårikå 67, which points out that the 
soul holds on to a body even after the obtainment of liberating [682] knowledge, like a 
potter's wheel, on account of the remaining impetus.7 Here a single person appears to be 
talked about. More information is given in the following passage of the Yuktid¥pikå:8 
 
But when the impetus disappears, the body caused by it is cut off. Then, "when 
the cutting off of the body has been obtained" (SK 68), dharma and adharma 
have attained their purpose and dissolve in their cause, which is the buddhi. And 
the part of the elements that have constituted that [puru∑a 's]  body 
[dissolves] in all the elements; the elements [dissolve] in the tanmåtras; the 
organs and the tanmåtras in the ahaµkåra; the ahaµkåra in the buddhi; the 
buddhi in the non-manifest. This series of essences (tattva), which has arisen out 
of pradhåna for that purpose, dissolves again, when its purpose has been 
accomplished, into pradhåna. Pradhåna, in its turn, by force of the purpose [that 
guides it], makes its bodies in various rebirths. (my emphasis, JB) 
                                                
6 YD p. 142 l. 26-30 (Pandeya) / p. 264 l. 21- p. 265 l. 2 (Wezler/Motegi): tatra 
nånåvarˆasvabhåvavijñånånåµ prek∑årthinåµ puru∑åˆåµ saµghåto ra∫ga ity ucyate/ nartakyåß ca 
tadårådhanå n®ttakriyånekapuru∑årthå/ yadi våtra kaßcid brËyån n®ttåcåryeˆa kuß¥lavair vå d®∑†aiveyaµ 
kasmån na nivartata iti tac cåpy asau k®tsnasya ra∫gasyautsukyånuparamån na nivartate/ katham/ 
ak®tårthatvåt/ evaµ sarvapuru∑åˆåµ kåryakaraˆasambandhenautsukyavatåµ niråkåµk∑¥karaˆårthaµ 
prav®ttå prak®ti˙ katham ekasya puru∑asyautsukyaniv®ttau k®tårthå syåt/ tasmån naikasya 
puru∑asyåtmånaµ prakåßya prak®ter niv®ttir yukteti/ 
7 The word is saµskåra, which is probably meant to be applicable both to the potter's wheel and to the 
liberated (and not yet liberated) person. In the case of persons some such translation as ‘mental traces’ is 
customary. 
8 YD p. 143 l. 26-31 (Pandeya) / p. 266 l. 11-18 (Wezler/Motegi): yadå tu saµskårak∑ayas tannimittasya 
ßar¥rasya bheda˙/ ata˙ pråpte ßar¥ rabhede  (SK 68) dharmådharmau k®tårthau kåraˆe buddhilak∑aˆe 
layaµ gacchata˙/ yaß cåsya bhËtåvayava˙ ßar¥rårambhaka˙ sa sarvabhËte∑u, bhËtåni tanmåtre∑u, 
indriyåˆi tanmåtråˆi cåhaµkåre, ahaµkåro buddhau, buddhir avyakte/ seyaµ tattvånupËrv¥ tadarthaµ 
pradhånåd utpannå, parisamåpte 'syårthe puna˙ pradhåne pralayaµ gacchati/ pradhånam apy arthavaßåd 
evåsya ßar¥råˆi te∑u te∑u jåtyantaraparivarte∑u karoti/.  
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The last sentence is not fully clear to me. The passage seems to mean that pradhåna 
makes bodies that dissolve back into pradhåna when the person concerned is liberated. 
Here again one has the impression that the commentator at any rate did not confuse 
psychology and cosmology. 
 Elsewhere the Yuktid¥pikå discusses the beginning of creation when, according 
to the position adopted by its author, no karmic residues influenced the events which 
were rather determined by a force called adhikåra, which I translate ‘obligation’. Here 
an opponent raises an objection which is subsequently discarded:9 
[683] 
[Objection:] It would follow that [all souls] possess a body in common. If it is 
accepted that a body comes into being at the beginning of creation caused by 
obligation, it would follow that all souls (puru∑a) are connected with one body, 
because there is no reason why [a separate body] should be linked [to each soul]. 
As a result other bodies would be superfluous, because all [souls] would be 
capable of experience through that single [body]. 
[Reply:] This is not correct, because it is in conflict with perception. It is true 
according to logic (anumåna), but [we know] from perception that there are 
bodies [one] for each soul. That is why it does not follow [that all souls possess 
a body in common]. 
 
This passage both formulates the problem that occupies us and expresses in no 
uncertain terms the position of the author of the Yuktid¥pikå. The Såµkhya scheme of 
evolution would be expected to give rise to but one body, not one for each soul. The 
opponent and the orthodox Såµkhya agree that this does not happen in normal times as 
a result of karma, which is different for each soul. However, at the beginning of 
creation karma plays no role, so at that time just one body for all the souls should come 
into being. Interestingly, the author of the Yuktid¥pikå agrees that this should be 
expected to be the case, but points out that we know from perception that it has not 
happened like that. 
 Gau∂apåda's commentary introduces the same kårikå 67 with a question:10 "If 
liberation comes about in a person when knowledge has arisen, then why is it not my 
liberation that comes about?" The answer is supposed to be given in kårikå 67, but 
neither this kårikå nor Gau∂apåda's comments on it answer the question explicitly. The 
kårikå merely seems to talk about the continuing body of the person who has obtained 
insight, and Gau∂apåda specifies that the kårikå is about a yogin, not therefore about all 
                                                
9 YD p. 161 l. 7-13 (ed. Wezler and Motegi); p. 73 l. 18-22 (ed. Pandeya): sådhåraˆavigrahatvaprasaµga 
iti cet/ syåd etat/ yady adhikåranimittå ßar¥rotpattir ådisarge 'bhyupagamyate pråptam ekena ßar¥reˆa 
sarvapuru∑åˆåm abhisambandho niyamahetvabhåvåt/ tataß ca ßar¥råntarånarthakyam/ tenaiva sarve∑åm 
upabhogasåmarthyåd iti/ etad anupapannam/ kasmåt? pratyak∑avirodhåt/ satyam etad anumånata˙/ 
pratyak∑atas tu ßar¥råˆi pratipuru∑am/ tasmån nåyaµ prasaµga˙/. 
10 Gau∂apådabhå∑ya introducing SK 67: yadi puru∑asyotpanne jñåne mok∑o bhavati tato mama kasmån 
na bhavati? 
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living beings. Yet Gau∂apåda's initial question forces us to conclude that for him the 
continued existence of other living beings is to be explained along the same lines: they 
continue to exist even after the liberation of one living being on account of the impetus 
present in them (saµskåravaßåt). 
 If the thinkers of classical Såµkhya did indeed not confuse these two, they must 
have somewhere drawn a line, in the middle of their evolutionary scheme, to distinguish 
between cosmological and psychological (or rather: individual) essences (tattva). 
MËlaprak®ti / pradhåna, as we know, is single; there is no separate version of it for each 
individual. At the other [684] end of the scheme, the organs are clearly different for 
different individuals. Also the elements are numerous. We must conclude that classical 
Såµkhya was not guilty of the contradiction that has been attributed to it. 
 This leads us to the next question. What do we know about the intermediate 
tattvas? How many mahats (buddhis) are there, and how many ahaµkåras? 
Unfortunately the texts are very little communicative about this issue. Yet there is at 
least one interesting remark in the Yuktid¥pikå to be considered:11 "The position of the 
followers of Vår∑agaˆya is that mahat is common [to all], because it is prak®ti." This 
seems to mean that there is no separate mahat (buddhi) for each individual. It also 
suggests that this position was disputed: Såµkhyas who were not followers of 
Vår∑agaˆya may have maintained that each person has his or her own mahat/buddhi.  
 Some remarks in Våcaspatimißra's commentary on the Yoga Bhå∑ya suggest that 
Våcaspati belonged to, or voiced the opinion of, those Såµkhyas who maintained that 
each person has his or her own mahat/buddhi. He begins a statement in the following 
manner:12 "Even though the connection between each single mahat etc. [and the 
puru∑a], though without beginning, is non-eternal ..." This occurs in the middle of a 
discussion in the Bhå∑ya about what happens to the visible (d®ßya), i.e. prak®ti, when a 
puru∑a becomes k®tårtha, i.e. reaches its aim. The answer is that the visible, even though 
it gets dissolved with respect to that one puru∑a, is not destroyed with respect to other 
puru∑as. Here the Bhå∑ya cites the following enigmatic phrase:13 "Because the 
connection between the characterised [and the puru∑as] is without beginning, also the 
connection between all the characters [and the puru∑as] is without beginning." By itself 
this quotation allows of various interpretations. Våcaspatimißra understands the 
characterised to be the guˆas, and ‘all the characters’ to be "mahat etc." Immediately 
following this he makes the remark quoted above, to the extent that the connection 
between each single mahat etc. [and the puru∑a], though without beginning, is non-
eternal. In spite of this, he then continues, "[the connection] between all the mahats etc. 
                                                
11 YD p. 121 l. 23 (Pandeya) / p. 230 l. 19-20 (Wezler/Motegi): sådhåraˆo hi mahån prak®titvåd iti 
vår∑agaˆånåµ pak∑a˙. 
12 TV 2.22: ekaikasya mahadåde˙ saµyogo 'nådir apy anitya eva yady api ... 
13 YBh 2.22: dharmiˆåm anådisaµyogåd dharmamåtråˆåm apy anådi˙ saµyoga iti. 
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[and the puru∑as] is eternal, because [all the mahats etc.] are common to other puru∑as 
(which are not [685] liberated)".14 It is safe to conclude that for Våcaspatimißra there 
are many mahats, not just one, and therefore most probably one mahat for each puru∑a. 
 The passage from the Yuktid¥pikå considered above leaves us with some 
difficulties, and indeed, the conclusion we have drawn from it is not altogether certain. 
The reason given for accepting that mahat is common to all is "because it is prak®ti" 
(prak®titvåt). But not only mahat is prak®ti; the same applies to its evolutes ahaµkåra 
and the tanmåtras, for they give rise to ultimate vik®tis, the organs of knowledge and 
action, the mind, and the elements. If this reason is consequently applied, only the 
ultimate vik®tis are multiple, one set belonging to each living being. 
 I know of no evidence that might once and for all decide this issue. I would 
however like to draw your attention to another issue that may not be altogether 
unrelated to it, the issue of the size of the various intermediate essences (tattva). 
Consider the following statement of the Yuktid¥pikå:15 
 
We accept that the prak®tis that are the tanmåtras have greater size (v®ddhi) [than 
their derivatives], for it is our doctrine that a prak®ti is larger than its effect. 
 
The passage is, once again, not as clear as we would like it to be. We may have to read 
it along with another passage from the same text, which explains the name mahat, 
which means "large", by stating that it is large in a spatial and in a temporal sense, 
larger than everything produced from it.16 This same opinion is also expressed in the 
Yoga Bhå∑ya on sËtra 2.19. The essences (tattva) are here divided into four categories: 
viße∑a, aviße∑a, li∫gamåtra and ali∫ga, and discussed in this order. The final evolutes — 
i.e. the five elements and the eleven organs — are the viße∑as. Their aviße∑as are the 
five tanmåtras and asmitåmåtra (= ahaµkåra?). These are modifications of li∫gamåtra, 
which is described as mahad åtman and as mere existence (sattåmåtra).17 Then the 
Bhå∑ya states: Residing in this mahad [686] åtman, in this mere existence, the aviße∑as 
experience the limit of their growth.18 Here too the impression is created that mahat is 
larger than all the essences that derive from it. 
                                                
14 TV 2.22: ... tathåpi sarve∑åµ mahadåd¥nåµ nitya˙ puru∑åntaråˆåµ sådhåraˆatvå[t]. 
15 YD p. 69 l. 11-12 (Pandeya) / p. 155 l. 16-18 (Wezler/Motegi): v®ddhimatyas tanmåtralak∑aˆå˙ 
prak®tayo 'småbhir abhyupagamyante/ kasmåt/ svakåryåd dhi prath¥yas¥ prak®tir bhavat¥ti ca na˙ 
samaya˙/. 
16 YD p. 91 l. 19 (Pandeya) / p. 187 l. 25-26 (Wezler/Motegi): sa tu deßamahattvåt kålamahattvåc ca 
mahån/ sarvotpådyebhyo mahåparimåˆayuktatvån mahån/. 
17 YBh 2.19: ete sattåmåtrasyåtmano mahata˙ ∑a∂ aviße∑apariˆåmå˙. This remarkable position, in which 
the tanmåtras are directly derived from mahat, is attributed to Såµkhya by Prajñåvarman's commentary 
on Udbha†asiddhasvåmin's Viße∑astava 48; see Schneider, 1993: 211 with n. 8. I thank Johannes 
Schneider for having drawn my attention to this passage. 
18 YBh 2.19: yat tat param aviße∑ebhyo li∫gamåtraµ mahat tattvaµ tasminn ete sattåmåtre mahaty 
åtmany avasthåya viv®ddhikå∑†håm anubhavanti. 
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 What can we conclude from this with regard to the size of the evolutes that 
derive from mahat? According to the passage of the Yuktid¥pikå discussed just now, a 
prak®ti is larger than its effect. The size of ahaµkåra and of the five tanmåtras should 
therefore be intermediate between the size of mahat and that of the final evolutes, i.e. 
the eleven faculties and the five elements. In the case of mahat we may assume that its 
size is very large, probably infinite. The size of most elements is limited, and the same, 
one would be tempted to think, is true of the faculties. However, at least one Såµkhya 
thinker, Vindhyavåsin, considered even the faculties to be omnipresent. As a result he 
had no need for a subtle body, the existence of which he therefore denied.19 
 Vindhyavåsin's position is intriguing, and perhaps significant. Did he, by 
attributing omnipresence to the faculties, simply extend an attribute to some of the final 
evolutes which all Såµkhyas accepted as belonging to the pre-final evolutes? In that 
case those pre-final evolutes must have been looked upon as omnipresent. Mahat and 
ahaµkåra, and perhaps the tanmåtras, would then have to be thought of as omnipresent. 
Unfortunately I have come across no evidence to that effect as far as ahaµkåra is 
concerned. 
 
 A few more words about the size of the tanmåtras. There are indications that the 
tanmåtras were at some time conceived of as being [687] atomic in nature.20 This is no 
longer the case in classical Såµkhya, as we have seen. Indeed, the Yuktid¥pikå 
explicitly rejects this position. The passage concerned occurs in the middle of a 
discussion regarding the question whether atoms (paramåˆu) can be looked upon as the 
cause of the world, a position which the author of the Yuktid¥pikå does not accept. The 
opponent then claims that a connection with atoms can be observed in the manifest 
world, because of the presence of colours etc.21 The Såµkhya replies that this can be 
accounted for differently, namely, with the help of the tanmåtras.22 A little later the 
opponent makes the following proposal: what would be wrong in accepting that the 
                                                
19 YD p. 121 l. 12-13 (Pandeya) / p. 230 l. 6-7 (Wezler/Motegi): vindhyavåsinas tu vibhutvåd indriyåˆåµ 
b¥jadeße v®ttyå janma/ tattyågo maraˆam/ tasmån nåsti sËk∑maßar¥ram/. It is in this context intriguing to 
recall that classical Jainism distinguishes five kinds of bodies, from coarse to subtle, and that the subtler a 
body is, the more spatial points it occupies; the two most subtle bodies can extend to the end of the 
universe without obstruction (Frauwallner, 1956: 269; Tattvårtha SËtra 2.37-41). 
20 See Motegi, 1986; Bronkhorst, forthcoming: appendix. 
21 YD p. 68 l. 26 (Pandeya) / p. 154 l. 22 (Wezler/Motegi): paramåˆvanvayo 'pi hi vyakta upalabhyate 
rËpådisattvåt. 
22 YD p. 69 l. 2-5 (Pandeya) / p. 155 l. 2-6 (Wezler/Motegi) : yat tu khalv idam ucyate p®thivyådi∑u 
rËpådyupalambhåd anvayadarßanåd aˆËnåµ sadbhåva˙ ... kalpayitavya ity etad api cånupapannam/ 
kasmåt? anyathåpi tadupapatthe˙/ tanmåtrapËrvakatve 'pi hi p®thivyåd¥nåµ kalpyamåne rËpådisattvåd ato 
na yuktam etat/. 
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tanmåtras are atoms?23 The Såµkhya rejects this proposal in a few lines that merit 
careful attention:24 
 
The answer is that it is not possible [that the tanmåtras are atoms]. We accept 
that the prak®tis that are the tanmåtras have greater size (v®ddhi) [than their 
derivatives], for it is our doctrine that a prak®ti is larger than its effect. The great 
elements earth etc. are of macroscopic size. It follows that their prak®ti must 
exceed them [in size]. Atoms, on the other hand (ca), have limited size. It does 
not therefore follow from the fact that we accept tanmåtras that we accept those 
[atoms]. 
 
Part of this passage we have already considered above. We now get to know it in its 
context, which is a discussion rejecting the proposal that tanmåtras are atoms. Given 
that earlier sources do seem to present the tanmåtras as [688] atoms, we cannot but 
conclude that the concept of the tanmåtra had profoundly changed. 
 
 We return to our original question. Do the above observations help us to answer 
the criticism voiced by Franco and cited at the beginning of this article? Franco said: 
"Typical psychological and individual terms like cognition, ego, mind, sense organs, 
and even hands, feet, tongue, anus and penis, become trans-individual and obtain 
cosmological dimensions." Does this still hold true for the main thinkers of classical 
Såµkhya? As we now know, the answer must be a qualified no. It is true that cognition 
and ego — i.e. mahat/buddhi and ahaµkåra — appear to have been shared, and 
therefore cosmological, entities for some, though not all Såµkhyas. Other elements — 
in particular mind, sense organs, as well as hands, feet, tongue, anus and penis — were 
looked upon as only individual, not trans-individual or cosmological entities. The 
tanmåtras remain enigmatic, but it is clear that they were not thought of as atomic by 
the author of the Yuktid¥pikå. 
 
 It is not possible to conclude this paper without casting a short glance at the 
second flourishing of Såµkhya in the second millennium of the common era. The 
thinkers of that period were evidently not content with the solution offered by the 
earlier school, for they present an altogether different one. Clearest in this respect is 
Vijñånabhik∑u's commentary on Såµkhya SËtra 3.10. The Såµkhya SËtra may date, in 
its present form, from the fourteenth or fifteenth century. Vijñånabhik∑u himself wrote 
                                                
23 YD p. 69 l. 10 (Pandeya) / p. 155 l. 14-15 (Wezler/Motegi): åha: yadi punas tanmåtråˆåm eva 
paramåˆutvam abhyupagamyate ka evaµ sati do∑a˙ syåt? 
24 YD p. 69 l. 10-14 (Pandeya) / p. 155 l. 16-21 (Wezler/Motegi): ucyate: na ßakyam evaµ bhavitum/ kiµ 
kåraˆam? v®ddhimatyas tanmåtralak∑aˆå˙ prak®tayo 'småbhir abhyupagamyante/ kasmåt? svakåryåd dhi 
prath¥yas¥ prak®tir bhavat¥ti ca na˙ samaya˙/ mahånti ca p®thivyåd¥ni mahåbhËtåni/ tasmåt te∑åµ 
tadatiriktayå prak®tyå bhavitavyam/ paricchinnadeßåß ca paramåˆava˙/ tasmån na tanmåtråbhyupagamåt 
te∑åm abhyupagama˙/. 
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in the sixteenth century. He speaks in this passage of the single (eka) subtle body (li∫ga) 
which is formed at creation and is an adjunct (upådhi) of Hiraˆyagarbha. This single 
subtle body subsequently divides into many (nånå) individuals, just as the single subtle 
body of a father becomes multiple in the form of the subtle bodies of his sons and 
daughters. This division of the subtle body of Hiraˆyagarbha is caused by the difference 
of karma of the individuals.25 It is true that Vijñånabhik∑u has a tendency to impose his 
own views on the Såµkhya philosophy, in particular the idea of a creator god. But his 
interpretation of Såµkhya SËtra 3.10 to the extent [689] that one subtle body is 
subsequently divided into many individuals seems correct.26  
 The threatening lack of coherence of classical Såµkhya did not escape the eye 
of a critic like Råmånuja. Råmånuja, who wrote his Ír¥ Bhå∑ya on the Brahma SËtra in 
the 12th century, points out that if there is one active material (prak®ti) for many 
inactive souls, all the actions of the former would provide experience to all the souls, or 
to none at all. He adds that the Såµkhya belief according to which the souls are of 
infinite size even excludes the possibility to answer that one soul is closer to a particular 
action than another. For this very reason a restriction even of the inner organs etc. to 
single souls is not possible, based on which there would be assignment of different 
actions to different souls.27 
 Critics like Råmånuja may be responsible for the fact that the Såµkhya SËtra 
and its commentaries have come up with their solution of a single subtle body in the 
beginning. They may however have missed the fact that classical Såµkhya had 
developed a more sophisticated interpretation of their basic theory, less susceptible to 
their criticism. 
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